By Gilbert Harman
Explaining worth is a variety of the easiest of Gilbert Harman's shorter writings in ethical philosophy. The 13 essays are divided into 4 sections, which concentration in activate ethical relativism, values and valuing, personality qualities and advantage ethics, and methods of explaining facets of morality. Harman's unique method of ethical philosophy has provoked a lot curiosity; this quantity bargains a desirable conspectus of his most vital paintings within the quarter.
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Extra resources for Explaining Value: and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy
In that case our basic moral understanding is incoherent, and various suggestions might be made concerning the ways in which this understanding should be modiﬁed. But this moral critique of the understanding can proceed from the understanding itself, rather than from ‘prior’ moral principles. In order to ﬁx ideas, consider a society in which there is a well-established and long-standing tradition of hereditary slavery. Let us suppose that everyone accepts this institution, including the slaves.
And the emotivist can also deny normative moral relativism, since he can (and no doubt will) suppose that the principles he accepts apply to all agents. Moreover, an existentialist might accept normative moral relativism on the grounds that each person is subject only to the principles that person accepts. This does not imply moral judgement relativism or meta-ethical relativism, since the existentialist can suppose that conﬂicting moral judgements about a particular agent cannot both be correct.
It makes no sense to ask whether George is tall, period, apart from one comparison class or another. Similarly, this form of moral judgement relativism holds that moral judgements make sense (are true or false) only in relation to one or another set of moral demands. Something can be right in relation to one morality and not right in relation to another. ’ The judgement that X is wrong is always incomplete, just as the judgement that P is tall is incomplete. We always understand the latter judgement as the judgement that P is tall for a person, or for a basketball player, etc.
Explaining Value: and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy by Gilbert Harman