By Stan van Hooft
This booklet offers an exploration of thoughts primary to wellbeing and fitness care perform. In exploring such ideas as Subjectivity, existence, Personhood, and dying in deep philosophical phrases, the booklet goals to attract out the moral calls for that come up after we come across those phenomena, and likewise the ethical assets of wellbeing and fitness care employees for assembly these calls for.
Values in Bioethics (ViB) makes on hand unique philosophical books in all parts of bioethics, together with scientific and nursing ethics, wellbeing and fitness care ethics, study ethics, environmental ethics, and worldwide bioethics.
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Extra info for Life, Death, and Subjectivity: Moral Sources in Bioethics
Hence subjectivity can be disclosed only in and to those creatures who can reflect and articulate the content of their reflection. Subjectivity is the presence to itself of a conscious being, insofar as it is conscious in that mode that permits self-consciousness. I can discern my subjectivity in reflection, but the subjectivity of any other person or creature is largely hidden from me. Only their own reflection can disclose their subjectivity and then only to themselves. Accordingly, it is difficult to attribute subjectivity to living things other than myself.
But it is also true in everyday functional relationships. When I say, “thank you” to the bus conductor, I am acknowledging her subjectivity and forming an I–Thou relationship. It may not be as rich as the relationship that my addressing my lover establishes, but it is a real instance of intersubjectivity nonetheless. Instead of highlighting the third-person descriptive point of view that characterizes science and Dennett’s philosophy, and expanding on the first-person point of view characteristic of phenomenological reflection, Buber has highlighted the secondperson stance of mutual address and acknowledgment.
For the moment, I want to stay with the question of how the subjectivity of the other can be apprehended. I can gain no direct perceptual entry into the mysterious interiority of another living creature. Whatever their experience is like for them, it cannot be my experience. Does this mean that my only knowledge of other living creatures is the descriptive and classificatory knowledge that the sciences of life and of humanity have developed? I would suggest that Dennett’s concept of intentionality as evinced by intentional systems, allows us to give third-person descriptions of that which, in an organism capable of self- 32 LIFE, DEATH, AND SUBJECTIVITY consciousness, would be experienced as subjectivity.
Life, Death, and Subjectivity: Moral Sources in Bioethics by Stan van Hooft