By Lawrence A. Blum
So much modern ethical philosophy is anxious with problems with rationality, universality, impartiality, and precept. against this Lawrence Blum is anxious with the psychology of ethical supplier. The essays during this assortment research the ethical import of emotion, motivation, judgment, conception, and staff identifications, and discover how these types of psychic capacities give a contribution to a morally stable lifestyles.
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21 PARTICULARITY form of relationship between Ann and Tony weaker than one that would generate strong obligations of friendship. And so it is not at all clear that Ann has the sort of friendship obligation to Tony that would require the helping act she performs. " In summary, even if Nagel is right to think that reasons of obligation are ultimately grounded in agent-relativity, Murdochian reasons comprise a further category of reason distinct from impersonal, agent-neutral, objective reasons.
Scheffler's solution to this problem is to accord independent weight to the personal point of view; this has the moral effect of allowing an agent to pursue his own projects to a greater degree than a purely impartial consequentialist would allow, although not restraining him from pursuing a pure consequentialist project, should he wish to do so. One finds no recognition in Scheffler, however, that a good deal of the moral life involves not being responsive to pure consequentialist demands but responding to particular other persons whose lives our lives are bound up with or touch in some way.
The moral task is not self-negation but self-transcending. One way in which Murdoch's view captures an important part of moral action is that in many cases of acting for the sake of another, it could not meaningfully be said whether the agent had lost more than the other had gained or not. Both consequentialism and the anticonsequentialist view that Slote articulates presuppose that the agent's benefit and loss are something determinate prior to the situation at hand. But often when we do something for another, although we are not thinking about ourselves, we are not clearly giving something up of ourselves either.
Moral Perception and Particularity by Lawrence A. Blum