Download e-book for iPad: The political economy of regulation: the case of insurance by Kenneth J. Meier

By Kenneth J. Meier

ISBN-10: 0887067328

ISBN-13: 9780887067327

Ebook by means of Meier, Kenneth J.

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Extra resources for The political economy of regulation: the case of insurance

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I would also like to thank The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and the American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI) for allowing me to use their libraries and badger their librarians. The number of individuals and organizations who responded promptly to requests for data and elaboration are far too numerous to mention. Finally, I would like to thank Peggy Gifford, Peter Colby, and the rest of the persons associated with SUNY Press for encouraging my efforts. Although I would truly like to share the blame with Bill and Paul for any errors I have made in the study, the errors are mine alone.

Page 18 Chapter 2 A Theory of Government Regulation The study of regulation has spawned several partial theories to explain government policy. Economists prefer their version of capture theory, which predicts that government policy is responsive to the regulated industry. Similarly, some political scientists and consumer advocates also hold dear the idea that regulatory agencies are captured by the industries they are intended to regulate. Both approaches are narrow views of the regulatory process that have outlived their usefulness as accurate predictors of government policy.

Commercial automobile insurance policies also can be customized to the buyer while private passenger policies rarely are. 5 These differences in product result in differences in industry structure. The private passenger automobile insurance market is dominated by direct writers. Direct writers are insurance companies that employ their own sales and claims staffs in contrast with companies that use independent agents to sell and service their policies. Direct writers, because they are more efficient, are able to sell individual insurance policies at a lower price.

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The political economy of regulation: the case of insurance by Kenneth J. Meier


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